Ron Bormans is ‘seriously alarmed’ as a consequence of the failed INEPAD project. ‘When you trust people and that trust is betrayed, it hits you hard. You have to pick yourself back up before being able to trust again with the same uninhibited openness.’

In 2016, Bormans ended an experiment with online distance learning initiated by a private Rotterdam University of Applied Sciences (Hogeschool Rotterdam) master degree in Brazil when it came to light that the Exam Board was not able to guarantee the quality of its assessments. This cost a lot of money and it shook his trust in the experimenting director (who has since been dismissed). But, says Bormans, ‘to stop trusting anyone; that’s not how I want to be, or do business.’

A report on the online master programme mentions – among other things – inadequate administrative supervision and a lack of proper organisation for a high-risk project. Did the board drop the ball? And what business does the Rotterdam University of Applied Sciences have being in Brazil at all? Bormans is very clear on this: ‘None, technically.’

What was the motivation for the RBS board to start experimenting with courses in Brazil?

‘Our private activities have not yielded great results. The (private) RBS master degrees were struggling to break even, while privately financed master programmes should be financially healthy. We said in 2014 that these master degrees would have to become healthy within three years, and that they would have to go otherwise. RBS’ director-chairman then asked if he could experiment with distance learning. I said: Yes, you can, provided that you stick to all the rules and agreements that apply to the master programmes we offer. These rules are set out in the Education and Examination Regulations, the EER.’

In a report on INEPAD, there is mention of a business plan that promised attractive financial results. Was the online master degree supposed to be profitable?

‘We never discussed profit for profit’s sake. There was a plan, labelled a “business plan” by others. I want to distance myself from that. It was about there being a proposal to restore commercial health to the non-funded master programmes. This was carefully written down and presented to us by the director. We discussed it as a board. Within the context of restoring financial health to the master degrees, the Administration, Information and Control department also cast their eyes over it: Is this heading in the right direction, is it too ambitious, is there enough progress, is it realistic? The RBS director took action on the basis of the above. There was very clear communication to RBS management on the values and standards that applied here, and we have had to conclude that these have not been altogether successfully adhered to.’

Was it a cause for concern to you that this was happening in Brazil?

‘Yes, indeed, it was a cause for concern. The investigation into the case, carried out by compliance officer Herman Veenema and risk manager Alexander van den Assum, also showed that we should have documented that better. The precious bureaucratic process of proper documentation, adequate recording – it should have been better. This is something we all have to take to heart, but the buck stops with me. It should have been done better, pure and simple.’

Did the board keep a close eye on the project? Did you regularly discuss the activities in Brazil with the director and other people involved?

‘I have had intensive conversations with the RBS chairman-director, both in bilateral meetings and at other occasions. But that was badly documented at that time, like I mentioned.’

And with the other people involved?

‘No, only with the Exam Board after they got in touch with us.’

Has there ever been a moment during those consultations when you thought: Is everything actually okay over there?

‘No, otherwise I would’ve expressed my concern and done something about it. I put my trust in the director, and yes, that trust was betrayed.’

The writers of the report suggest that the right thing for this education experiment would have been to set up a project organisation. Major risks demand better organisation and supervision, is the general gist. Why did the board not do this?

‘Because there was no reason to believe that the pilot was not workable. The frameworks surrounding this pilot were crystal clear. Apparently, various colleagues from RBS and the services were involved at a certain point, and a comprehensive approach was lacking. This only became apparent after the Exam Board had already expressed their concern. It exposed the pilot’s shortcomings.’

Was that the first time you realised that something was wrong?

‘Yes, that was when the Exam Board came to us and said that they could not guarantee the assessment quality. I asked them: Are there other ways to ascertain the quality? They considered this, came back to me and said: ‘No, we cannot guarantee it.’ It was at this point that I had to take charge. I subsequently respected the independent position of the opinion offered to me and decided: We have to call it to a halt. I was aware that it would become a painful affair, and also an expensive one.
‘I am very happy with the Exam Board’s attitude. Its members remained firm. That’s something worth mentioning. Although it was an unpleasant situation for the students, the system that is in place to safeguard quality has worked well so far.’

Are there any more international adventures in the pipeline?

‘No. Nor was this a precursor for rolling out projects all over the world. It was an experiment. RBS is an international institute. I didn’t think it was far-fetched to look further afield. It will not be put into practise in other places, especially after the experiences we’ve had, but it was interesting at the same time. We wholeheartedly agreed to experimenting with the blended learning option.
‘What went wrong here is that the Exam Board could not adequately observe what was happening there. The RBS management should have known that beforehand. If there is a situation where you cannot guarantee the quality, you should call it off. Full stop. That is completely clear. It was assumed, in the boardroom and by staff involved, that things would be organised in a manner that would allow the Exam Board to ascertain the ins and outs. The fact that the RBS management acted the way they did was a design flaw. From the perspective of the space that RBS had been allowed – the Education and Examination Regulations – it should not have been designed this way.’

The director who was responsible for the activities in Brazil was dismissed in December 2016 for fraud. The failure of the online Consultancy and Entrepreneurship master degree was not the reason for the director’s dismissal. Why not?

‘We did not identify any criminal offences in this case.’

Was there self-enrichment?

‘None that we could establish, and if we had found only a sliver of evidence to presume that any criminal offences had been committed, such as any diversion of funds, we would have taken action.’

The director signed a contract that he should not have signed. Why was this not part of the dismissal case?

‘From an administrative perspective, it is a very serious issue within a university of applied sciences such as this one, but it is not a punishable offence.’

Is the Supervisory Board aware of the situation?

‘Yes. From day 1, we exercised 100% transparency towards a number of regulators around us. We notified the Education Inspectorate, because I feel I have to organise supervision of our actions. Moreover, I don’t want these organisations to hear this news from anyone else. We had our own accountant examine the file and I have always laid our cards on the table towards my own Supervisory Board as well. I keep them updated religiously.
‘As it was my initiative to put this on the agenda, I try to convey that directors also have to take proactive steps in case of confidential issues, and with a delicate issue like this, that it is not scary to say: ‘As a guardian of the system, I too have to take away lessons.’ If you sweep it under carpet, there can be no learning from these situations.’

What did you learn from this case?

‘That there should be no compromising on quality. And that the bureaucracy we like to moan about can actually be very beneficial. There is such a thing as too much bureaucracy, but not enough is also possible. We have learned that rules alone do not cut it. That it is also about people who must apply those rules with integrity and in a conscientious manner. It’s about a balance of good organisation and the realisation that the human factor plays a part in every system. Any system will fail if the main players stray outside the framework of what is permissible, or even sign contracts when they are not authorised to do so. Also, trust requires maintenance. That’s what I learned from this.’

Which measures have you taken to prevent a repeat occurrence?

‘We are now better at recording the agreements that are made. Any agreements made during bilateral meetings are listed and made available to staff, so that team members are also much better informed.
‘We have also raised integrity as a permanent topic of discussion within the organisation. Trust is good, but it has to be fostered and maintained. This is why we regularly talk to directors about integrity. Not from a perspective that this integrity is lacking, but to keep it in focus. As an organisation, we have to take steps to build a culture where we can call one another to account and if necessary, escalate.
‘I have intensified the dialogue with Exam Boards, emphasised that they must take their autonomous position seriously, and encouraged them to organise mutual consultation.
‘At the same time, we have taken some systemic measures. We have centralised procurement and given the directors less room to take decisions regarding procurement independently.
‘It is ironic that I have been very vocal about decentralisation over the last few years, and now I am responsible for significant centralisation measures.’

Text: Olmo Linthorst & Dorine van Namen
Photo: Frank Hanswijk